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公共产品和阿罗不可能定理
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用public good* 和Arrow impossibility theorem在所有数据库中检索，只检索到5篇文章，有一篇是韩国或者朝鲜的数据库，有一篇大概是西班牙数据库里的，有两篇来自social choice and welfare
| 第 1 条，共 5 条 |
| 作者: Redekop, J (Redekop, J) |
| 标题: Arrow theorems in mixed goods, stochastic, and dynamic economic environments |
| 来源出版物: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE |
| 卷: 13 |
| 期: 1 |
| 页: 95-112 |
| DOI: 10.1007/BF00179101 |
| 出版年: JAN 1996 |
| 摘要: The original Arrow Theorem and many variants were stated with the Universal Domain assumption; but in economic situations, natural assumptions like monotonicity restrict the domain so that the Theorem does not apply. Since 1979, several authors have proved Arrow-type impossibility results in situations such as models with public goods or private goods; and a few have considered mixed-goods or stochastic alternatives models. This paper has similar results in models with mixed-goods, stochastic, and dynamic alternatives; the objects of preference can have any two features or all three. With suitable qualifications, the impossibility result continues to hold, as does the ''Arrow-inconsistency of arbitrarily small domains'' type of result I have established elsewhere. |
| Russian Science Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| SciELO Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| Web of Science 核心合集中的 "被引频次": 2 |
| 在中国科学引文数据库中的被引频次: 0 |
| 在 BIOSIS Citation Index 中的被引频次: 0 |
| Arabic Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| 被引频次合计: 2 |
| ISSN: 0176-1714 |
| 入藏号: WOS:A1996TM39500009 |
| 第 2 条，共 5 条 |
| 作者: Geslin, S (Geslin, S); Salles, M (Salles, M); Ziad, A (Ziad, A) |
| 标题: Fuzzy aggregation in economic environments I. Quantitative fuzziness, public goods and monotonicity assumptions |
| 来源出版物: MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES |
| 卷: 45 |
| 期: 2 |
| 页: 155-166 |
| DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00023-4 |
| 出版年: APR 2003 |
| 摘要: Vagueness of preferences has been formalized by using the tools of fuzzy set theory, particularly in a quantitative context. Considering fuzzy aggregation (aggregation of lists of individual fuzzy preferences into a social fuzzy preference), Barrett, Pattanaik and Salles (BPS) showed that Arrow's impossibility theorem and Gibbard's oligarchy theorem were essentially preserved, given appropriate properties of fuzzy preferences and a sort of unrestricted domain condition. In a series of papers, we intend to analyze fuzzy aggregation in an economic environment. This means that the set of alternatives has some specific mathematical structure and preferences are, in some way, restricted. This first paper deals with the case where the set of alternatives are public goods, preferences exhibit various assumptions, in particular monotonicity assumptions, while BPS other assumptions are preserved. It is shown that according to which monotonicity assumptions are made, possibility results (given by the mean rule) or impossibility results prevail. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. |
| Arabic Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| 在 BIOSIS Citation Index 中的被引频次: 0 |
| Web of Science 核心合集中的 "被引频次": 6 |
| Russian Science Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| 在中国科学引文数据库中的被引频次: 0 |
| SciELO Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| 被引频次合计: 6 |
| ISSN: 0165-4896 |
| 入藏号: WOS:000182783400006 |
| 第 3 条，共 5 条 |
| 作者: CAMPBELL, DE (CAMPBELL, DE) |
| 标题: NONBINARY SOCIAL CHOICE FOR ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS |
| 来源出版物: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE |
| 卷: 12 |
| 期: 3 |
| 页: 245-254 |
| 出版年: JUN 1995 |
| 摘要: Assume a finite integer l greater than or equal to 2 and a social choice correspondence Phi mapping each (p, Z) into a nonempty subset Phi (p, Z) of Z, where p is a profile of individual preferences and Z is a set of outcomes of cardinality l or more. Suppose that Phi satisfies Arrow's choice axiom, independence of infeasible alternatives, and the Pareto criterion. If the preference domain is the family of profiles of classical economic preferences over the space of allocations of public goods, then Phi is dictatorial. |
| Web of Science 核心合集中的 "被引频次": 5 |
| Russian Science Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| 在中国科学引文数据库中的被引频次: 0 |
| Arabic Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| SciELO Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| 在 BIOSIS Citation Index 中的被引频次: 0 |
| 被引频次合计: 5 |
| ISSN: 0176-1714 |
| 入藏号: WOS:A1995RH02100004 |
| 第 4 条，共 5 条 |
| 作者: Araque Solano, Alex Smith; Gutiérrez López, Julián Alberto; Quenguan López, Lina Fernanda |
| 作者识别号: |
| 作者Web of Science ResearcherIDORCID 号Araque-Solano, Alex 0000-0001-6329-5086 |
| 标题: El espacio público en la ciudad: Una aproximación desde los precios hedónicos |
| 标题: O espaço público na cidade: Uma abordagem de preços hedónicos |
| 标题: The public space in the city: An approximation from the hedonic prices |
| 来源出版物: Sociedad y Economía |
| 期: 33 |
| 页: 77-98 |
| DOI: 10.25100/sye.v0i33.5625 |
| 出版年: 2017-07 |
| 摘要: Abstract This is a research applied to the Bogota parks system, which aims to propose an econometric model to determine the value of the public space soil. Given the complexity of valuing public land, the research is developed from combining the determinants of social choice theory through Arrow's impossibility theorem and the price model (by emphasizing the urban structure). In view of the above, the Ombudsman of Public Space of Bogotá has obtained, as a main result, evidence that there is a high social value of public space, putting as a challenge the incorporation of more refined economic analyzes that describe the different evaluations society makes of the public space. Likewise, it was found that the presence of public spaces in the urban context highly influences the determination of private land prices. |
| 摘要: Resumen Esta es una investigación aplicada al sistema de parques de Bogotá, la cual tiene como objetivo proponer un modelo econométrico de determinación del valor del suelo del espacio público. Dada la complejidad para valorar el suelo público, la investigación se desarrolla a partir de combinar las determinantes de la teoría de la elección social por medio del teorema de la imposibilidad de Arrow y el modelo de precios (haciendo énfasis en la estructura urbana). Frente a lo anterior, la Defensoría del Espacio Público de Bogotá ha obtenido, como principal resultado, la evidencia de que existe una alta valoración social del espacio público, poniendo como reto la incorporación de análisis económicos más refinados que describan las diferentes valoraciones que hace la sociedad del espacio público. Así mismo, se encontró que la presencia de espacios públicos en el contexto urbano influye altamente en la determinación de los precios del suelo privado. |
| 摘要: Resumo Este documento é o resultado de uma pesquisa aplicada ao sistema dos parques na cidade de Bogotá, e tem como objetivo propor um modelo econométrico para determinar o valor do solo do espaço público. Dada a complexidade da valorização do solo público, a pesquisa foi desenvolvida combinando os determinantes da teoria da escolha social por meio do teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow e do modelo de preços (enfatizando a estrutura urbana). A Defensoria do Espaço Público, de Bogotá, conseguiu como resultado principal, a evidência de que existe um alto valor social do espaço público, exigindo a incorporação de análises econômicas mais refinadas para descrever os diferentes critérios de valor que a sociedade faz do espaço público. Verificou-se também que a presença de espaços públicos no contexto urbano, influenciou fortemente a determinação dos preços do solo privado. |
| Russian Science Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| Web of Science 核心合集中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| SciELO Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 1 |
| 在 BIOSIS Citation Index 中的被引频次: 0 |
| Arabic Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| 在中国科学引文数据库中的被引频次: 0 |
| 被引频次合计: 1 |
| ISSN: 2389-9050 |
| 入藏号: SCIELO:S1657-63572017000200077 |
| 第 5 条，共 5 条 |
| 作者: Cho, Hong Sik |
| 标题: Democracy and Market Economy |
| 标题: 民主主義와 市場主義 |
| 来源出版物: 서울대학교 법학 |
| 卷: 45 |
| 期: 4 |
| 页: 324-393 |
| 出版年: 2004 |
| 摘要: If there was a prevailing trend in the affairs of nations in the past twentieth centuryit was the increasing role of governments in the allocation of society's resources.Especially in Korea spotlighted as a paragon of “developmental state” amongdeveloping countries, the government was deemed to play a decisive role in itseconomic development. As the government-driven economy reveals its limit at theturn of the century, however, the government is no longer regarded as the institutionto achieve social welfare maximization even though there is little doubt that thegovernment is a central institution in the allocation of social resources. With aworldwide sweeping trend of neo-liberalism and globalization, a tough criticismcurrently arises against governmental intrusion into market economy. The criticismagainst governments is basically based on disbelief in democracy as a mechanism toefficiently allocate society's resources. Nowadays, a new motto “Don't let the marketbe left to politics!” is on the verge of becoming a cliche. This article is particularlyplanned to suggest counter-arguments against this “market-politics dichotomy” forfear that it should militate in favor of unconditional expansion of market principle.Under the circumstances it seems imperative that we correctly understand pros andcons of democracy vis-a-vis market economy.Part I tries to define democracy and market economy by enumerating differencesand similarities between market and collective action. While competitive behavior ispresent in both the market and public sectors, private-sector action is based onvoluntary choice; public-sector action is based on majority rule. While democracyturns on the rule of “one man, one vote”, the market on the rule of “one dollar, one vote.” While the market is a system of effectively proportional representation, thetypical issue must be decided “yes” or “no” in political channels.Part II explores the two grounds on which disbelief in democracy is based:ideologically, neo-liberalism and theoretically, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Thevoting process can protect democracy against dictatorship, but generally at the cost ofsocial efficiency. Kenneth Arrow successfully proved that there is no democraticcollective choice process capable of allocating societal resources efficiently.Against background of Part II's findings, Part III and IV try to reevaluate pros andcons of democracy, historically and theoretically. Pointing out examples such as legalban against child labor which was once considered as an illegitimate governmentalintrusion into market, Part III first claims that the borderline between market andgovernment, varying historically, just reflects the idea of the times. Neo-liberalism ismore likely to be another ideology rather than to symbolize the end of history. PartIII also suggests that American history is filled with vicissitudes of market economy.Part IV tries to refute Arrow's theorem theoretically. Arrow's Theorem implies thatany collective choice mechanism which we might design must be imperfect: eitherefficient but dictatorial or democratic but inefficient. To overcome the dilemmaArrow put us in, Part IV explores some ways to escape from it. Part IV begins with“paper-scissors-rock” theory. It first defines the essential conceptual factors ofmarket and collective action by reaffirming the differences and similarities betweenmarket and collective action; second, devises two kinds of games each rule of whichrespectively embodies the essential conceptual factors of market and collectiveaction; third, applies each rule to game situation; fourth, finds that outcomes ofgames where each rule is applied are all the same. The theory tells us that if wediscard one or more of Arrow's original requirements, there can be an efficientcollective choice process. Part IV then relaxes non-dictatorship requirement. Arrow'sTheorem itself shows that if we will tolerate a dictator we can satisfy the remainingfour requirements. There are problems for the dictator, however. There is nothing inthe remaining four requirements that guarantees the other members of society willtruthfully reveal their preferences to the dictator. An optimal allocation based onfalse preferences is a hollow victory. To overcome this problem, the author suggests Cass Sunstein's deliberative democracy and Habermas' discourse theory. Bothscholars tells us that if we can take democracy not as voting process, but asdeliberative process where society members' preferences are transformed(rather thangiven) by discussing among them about common good, we can prevail over disbeliefin democracy. Part IV's final resort is so-called psychometric paradigm. Here, theauthor emphasizes the specific ability of collective choice process which marketlacks; collective choice process responds better to things, events, and relationshipsthat are not assessed along a single metric.Part V begins by pointing out that neither the institution of markets nor theinstitution of governments stands as the unarguably preferred means for allocatingsocietal resources. Accordingly, the following question ensues: Under whatcircumstances are markets or governments the preferred institution for allocatingsocietal resources? Each institution has its own strengths and weaknesses. Whilemarkets husband information and respond to variations in individual preferences andabilities, they are often unable to ensure cooperative behavior in many instances.Governments, on the other hand, can enforce a cooperative allocation, but often atthe cost of being less responsive than markets to variations in individual preferencesand abilities. The central task now before us is to decide just what allocations are besthandled by a market process and which are best left to a collective choice process.Reminding us that the borderline between market and government is not a priori, buthistorical and institutional, Part V concludes that the borderline can be drawnaccording to the reference point of our choice. |
| SciELO Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
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| Arabic Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| Russian Science Citation Index 中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| Web of Science 核心合集中的 "被引频次": 0 |
| 在中国科学引文数据库中的被引频次: 0 |
| 被引频次合计: 0 |
| ISSN: 1598-222X |
| 入藏号: KJD:ART001269970 |
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