1. 当代哲学的一个任务是解决道德伦理问题，为此哲学家们经常要辩论一些假想的难题，其中较著名的一个是“电车难题”：假设有一列失控的有轨电车飞奔而来，前面有两条轨道，一条站着五个人，一条站着一个人。如果不扳道岔，电车将冲向第一条轨道压死五个人。那么是否应该扳道岔，将电车引向另一条轨道，压死上面的那一个人？大多数人会回答应 该，因为牺牲一个人拯救五个人是值得的。

The present study was inspired by a family of ethical dilemmas familiar to contemporary moral philosophers. One such dilemma is the trolley dilemma: A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Ought you to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one? Most people say yes.

2. 现在，再考虑另一个难题：同样有一列失控的有轨电车飞奔而来，前方的轨道上站着五个人处于危险之中。在电车和五个人中间，隔着一座天桥，桥上站着一位陌生的大胖子。拯救这五个人的唯一办法，是把这个大胖子推下天桥，电车将他撞死后就会停下来。那么是否应该把这个人推下桥去拯救五个人？大多数人会对这个“天桥难题”说不应该。

Now consider a similar problem, the footbridge dilemma. As before, a trolley threatens to kill five people. You are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge that spans the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the five people. In this scenario, the only way to save the five people is to push this stranger off the bridge, onto the tracks below. He will die if you do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Ought you to save the five others by pushing this stranger to his death? Most people say no.

3. ②为什么同样是牺牲一个人拯救五个人，人们却会做出不同的道德判断？①对诸如此类的问题的争论，使得哲学家们有活可干。③一种经典的解释是，在“电车难题”中，牺牲掉的那个人是不幸碰巧站在另一条轨道上，并没有被直接用来拯救另五个人；而在“天桥难题”中，胖子是直接被用来拯救五个人的，因此直接利用一个人的生命来拯救他人，是不道德的。那么我们再来看一个“电车难题”的变型：假设站着一个人的那条轨道的另一端是跟另一条轨道相连的，即形成一个回路，如果那上面没有这个人，电车会从这条轨道绕回来到另一条轨道压死五个人。在压死这个人后，电车会停下来，不会危及另五个人。在这种情况下，是否应该把电车引向站着一个人的轨道去压死他？虽然这一次，这个人是被直接利用了，大多数人仍然会回答应该。

①Taken together, these two dilemmas create a puzzle for moral philosophers: ②What makes it morally acceptable to sacrifice one life to save five in the trolley dilemma but not in the footbridge dilemma?

Many answers have been proposed. For example, ③one might suggest, in a Kantian vein, that the difference between these two cases lies in the fact that in the footbridge dilemma one literally uses a fellow human being as a means to some independent end, whereas in the trolley dilemma the unfortunate person just happens to be in the way. This answer, however, runs into trouble with a variant of the trolley dilemma in which the track leading to the one person loops around to connect with the track leading to the five people. Here we will suppose that without a body on the alternate track, the trolley would, if turned that way, make its way to the other track and kill the five people as well. In this variant, as in the footbridge dilemma, you would use someone's body to stop the trolley from killing the five. Most agree, nevertheless, that it is still appropriate to turn the trolley in this case in spite of the fact that here, too, we have a case of "using."

4. ①可见，“直接利用是不道德的”的解释遇到了麻烦。②还有人提出了别的解释，但也都有人想到了与之相抵触的例子。至今还未找到一个能被普遍接受的解释。③有心理学家认为，“天桥难题”之所以和“电车难题”的选择结果不同，是因为将一个人推下桥这种做法让人在感情上接受不了，觉得太残忍。④也就是说，感情会影响人们的道德判断。但是哲学家们普遍认为，道德判断应该是在理性思考的基础上做出的，不应带着感情。

①This answer, however, runs into trouble with……

②These are just one proposed solution and one counterexample, but together they illustrate the sort of dialectical difficulties that all proposed solutions to this problem have encountered. If a solution to this problem exists, it is not obvious. That is, there is no set of consistent, readily accessible moral principles that captures people's intuitions concerning what behavior is or is not appropriate in these and similar cases.

③We maintain that, from a psychological point of view, the crucial difference between the trolley dilemma and the footbridge dilemma lies in the latter's tendency to engage people's emotions in a way that the former does not.

④it is this emotional response that accounts for people's tendency to treat these cases differently.

5. ①最近，美国普林斯顿大学的心理学家用实验对这个“感情说”进行了验证。②他们让试验对象对60个难题做出决定，③并用“功能性磁共振影像技术”监测大脑功能区的变化。大脑功能区被激活后，那里的血流和脑氧代谢都增加，用磁共振对大脑进行扫描就可以形象地展现大脑各个功能区的活动情况。这60个难题分为三组：④一组是与人身密切相关(也即可能会调动感情)的道德难题，包括“天桥难题”和其他类似的道德难题(像偷了一个人的内脏器官去拯救五个人，是否应该？在救生艇因超载面临沉没时，是否应该把某个人扔到海里？等等)；⑤一组是与人身关系不密切或无关的非人化的道德难题，包括“电车难题”和类似的道德难题(例如捡到了钱，该不该还给失主？)；⑥还有一组做为空白对照，是与道德无关的难题(例如出门旅行，是坐汽车还是坐火车好？)。

①The present investigation is an attempt to test this more general hypothesis.

②In each of two studies, Experiments 1 and 2, we used a battery of 60 practical dilemmas.

③In each experiment, nine participants responded to each of 60 dilemmas while undergoing brain scanning using fMRI.

Two independent coders evaluated each moral dilemma using three criteria designed to capture the difference between ④the intuitively "up close and personal" (and putatively more emotional) sort of violation exhibited by the footbridge dilemma and ⑤the more intuitively impersonal (and putatively less emotional) violation exhibited by the trolley dilemma. Moral dilemmas meeting these criteria were assigned to the "moral-personal" condition, the others to the "moral-impersonal" condition.

④Typical moral-personal dilemmas included a version of the footbridge dilemma, a case of stealing one person's organs in order to distribute them to five others, and a case of throwing people off a sinking lifeboat.

⑤Typical moral-impersonal dilemmas included a version of the trolley dilemma, a case of keeping money found in a lost wallet, and a case of voting for a policy expected to cause more deaths than its alternatives.

These dilemmas were divided into "moral" and ⑥"non-moral" categories on the basis of the responses of pilot participants. (Typical examples of non-moral dilemmas posed questions about whether to travel by bus or by train given certain time constraints and about which of two coupons to use at a store.)

6. ①结果表明，人们在判断人身化道德难题时，与判断非人化道德难题和非道德难题相比，大脑中与感情有关的区域明显变得活跃，③而与记忆有关的区域则活跃程度明显降低(②以前的研究已表明，人们在处理感情问题时，大脑记忆区域受到抑制)。④少数人对“天桥难题”这类问题做出了“应该”的回答，而他们花的时间要比那些回答“不应该”的人长得多，这也是可以理解的，他们要花更多的时间思考，让理智战胜感情。而对非人化道德难题和非道德难题，回答“应该”和“不应该”所用的时间没有差别。

①Planned comparisons on these areas revealed that medial portions of Brodmann's Areas (BA) 9 and 10 (medial frontal gyrus), BA 31 (posterior cingulate gyrus), and BA 39 (angular gyrus, bilateral) were significantly more active in the moral-personal condition than in the moral-impersonal and the non-moral conditions. Recent functional imaging studies have associated each of these areas with emotion. ②Areas associated with working memory have been found to become less active during emotional processing as compared to periods of cognitive processing. ③BA 46 (middle frontal gyrus, right) and BA 7/40 (parietal lobe, bilateral)--both associated with working memory--were significantly less active in the moral-personal condition than in the other two conditions. In BA 39 (bilateral), BA 46, and BA 7/40 (bilateral), there was no significant difference between the moral-impersonal and the non-moral condition.

④As predicted, responses of "appropriate" (emotionally incongruent) were significantly slower than responses of "inappropriate" (emotionally congruent) within the moral-personal condition, and there was no significant difference in reaction time between responses of "appropriate" and "inappropriate" in the other two conditions.

7. ①这个实验结果，对主流哲学家是个打击，他们向来主张道德判断是纯理性的，而现在却必须考虑其中的感情因素。②但是，这个实验其实并没有解决这些道德难题。它并没有告诉人们，把一个人推下天桥救其他人是对是错，而是告诉人们，为什么人们会做出是对是错的选择。换句话说，它只是揭示了人们做道德判断时的一个心理机制。②有一个问题仍然有待解决：在我们对道德判断的心理机制有了更好的理解之后，是否会影响我们的道德决定？如果会的话，将会有怎样的影响？在我们知道对“天桥难题”的选择原来是受情绪影响后，是否会有更多的人狠下心来理智地选择“应该”？是否应该选择“应该”？哲学家们不必担心失业。

①The long-standing rationalist tradition in moral psychology emphasizes the role of reason in moral judgment. A more recent trend places increased emphasis on emotion.

②Our conclusion, therefore, is descriptive rather than prescriptive. We do not claim to have shown any actions or judgments to be morally right or wrong. Nor have we argued that emotional response is the sole determinant of judgments concerning moral dilemmas of the kind discussed in this study. On the contrary, the behavioral influence of these emotional responses is most strongly suggested in the performance of those participants who judge in spite of their emotions.

③The present results raise but do not answer a more general question concerning the relation between the aforementioned philosophical and psychological puzzles: How will a better understanding of the mechanisms that give rise to our moral judgments alter our attitudes toward the moral judgments we make?