好久没有介绍哲学家们的工作了，恰好最近在看一点东西，涉及到澳大利亚哲学家J.J.C.Smart 的心-身同一论问题（the mind-body identity theory），这应该是当代最早涉及这个话题的人之一，具体文章如下：J. J. 斯马特的论文《感觉和大脑过程》(Philosophical Review 68(1959), 141－56)。

心-身同一论话题时至今日仍是心灵哲学的热点，不过当今的讨论已经越发复杂，渐渐让人只见树木不见森林了。繁琐的论证反而把一个有趣的话题弄得毫无趣味，从这个意义上说，斯马特1959年的论述就显得清晰简洁，他的主要观点简单说就是：心理过程与大脑过程严格同一。这种说法很有唯物主义的味道。虽然他的考虑今天看来有些简单，但基本思路我们还是认同的。下面是斯马特的一个简单介绍：

John Jamieson Carswell "Jack" Smart AC (1920 –  2012 ） was an Australianphilosopher and academic, and was appointed as an Emeritus Professor by the Australian National University. He worked in the fields of metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and political philosophy. He wrote multiple entries for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Sensations and Brain Processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.

斯马特先后毕业于牛津大学和格拉斯哥大学。从事的哲学领域众多：形而上学、科学哲学、心灵哲学、宗教哲学还有政治哲学。涉猎广泛，成果甚丰！

老先生活了92岁，也算高寿。国内他的著作出版不多，好像2018年北京大学出版社出版过一本他与伯纳德合著《功利主义的赞成与反对》的，这本书我还没有看过。关于这个主题有一个人（István Aranyosi ，Bilkent University）的概括写得不错，见下面：

About this topic ：主要是心身同一论的经典人物和文章：

Summary ：The mind-brain identity theory (or identity thesis) is the assertion that mental states/events/processes are identical to brain states/events/processes. The type identity theory (often called just the "identity theory") says that mental types are physical types, while the token identity theory says that mental tokens are physical tokens.  Over the years the thesis has been successively understood as involving a contingent identity relation, an analytic identity relation, and then an posteriori necessary identity relation.  The most common objection to the type identity theory is the objection from multiple realizability. 

Key works ：The thesis is explicitly defended in seminal articles by Place 1956, Feigl 1958, Smart 1959. This is the early stage, when the thesis is understood as an empirical and contingent one. A powerful attack on this version is put forward by Kripke 1980.  The analytic identity thesis appears for the first time in Lewis 1970, then in Armstrong 1968. Criticism of this version appears appears in Nagel 1979, Jackson 1982, and Chalmers 1996. Defences appear in Braddon-Mitchell 2003 and Jackson 2003. A more recent defence, based on probability theory, appears in Aranyosi 2011.  The empirical necessary identity thesis is defended, among others, by Loar 1990 and Papineau 2002. Criticism of this approach is to be found in Chalmers 1996 and Chalmers 2009.  The multiple realizability objection to all forms of the type identity theory can be found in Putnam 1963. 

Introductions： A 30-year retrospective of the transformations of the thesis appears in Place 1988. A more recent introduction to and history of the thesis appears in Smart 2007.

澳大利亚20世纪后半期出了不少杰出哲学家，就如同斯马特61年前的这篇开创性文章《感觉和大脑过程》。

说明：文中第一张图片就是斯马特教授。下图为网上找到的风光图片，没有任何商业目的，仅供欣赏，特此致谢！

2020-1-14凌晨2:24于南方临屏涂鸦