The Essence of DIKWP Active Medicine: A Cross-Cultural Dialogue on Cosmic Order, Reason, and Virtue

Yucong Duan

International Standardization Committee of Networked DIKWP for Artificial Intelligence Evaluation(DIKWP-SC)

World Artificial Consciousness CIC(WAC)

World Conference on Artificial Consciousness(WCAC)

(Email: duanyucong@hotmail.com)

Abstract:“Preserving Heaven’s principle and removing human desires” is a key moral maxim in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, emphasizing the innate goodness of human nature and the cultivation of moral rationality. Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), a pivotal figure in Western modern philosophy, builds his ethics on rational understanding of the natural world, arguing that by elevating desires through reason, one can attain spiritual freedom. This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of the Neo-Confucian idea of “preserving Heaven’s principle and removing human desires” and Spinoza’s philosophy, examining their conceptions of cosmic order, the relationship between desires and reason, methods of moral practice, and views on sociopolitical order. Despite their distinct cultural and historical contexts, both traditions affirm the central role of reasoned insight in moral growth and social harmony. Through this cross-cultural comparison, the paper offers valuable perspectives for contemporary ethical reflection and philosophical dialogue.

IntroductionNeo-Confucianism, represented by thinkers such as Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, and Zhu Xi, organically integrates metaphysics and ethics, with “preserving Heaven’s principle and removing human desires” serving as a succinct summary of its core moral tenets. According to this view, human nature is originally good, endowed with the moral principle of Heaven, yet it becomes clouded by selfish desires. The task, therefore, is to overcome these desires to restore innate goodness.

In contrast, Baruch Spinoza, living in 17th-century Europe, developed a philosophy rooted in rational understanding of a single, infinite substance identified with God or Nature (Deus sive Natura). Although he does not demand the suppression of all desires, he maintains that achieving freedom involves converting passive, blind impulses into active, rationally guided desires through an understanding of nature’s necessary order.

By comparing “preserving Heaven’s principle and removing human desires” with Spinoza’s philosophy, this paper explores their differences and commonalities in metaphysical foundations, the role of desires and reason, the paths of moral practice, and sociopolitical implications. Such a cross-cultural philosophical comparison offers deeper insight into the universal human pursuit of virtue and freedom.

I. Metaphysical Foundations: Heaven’s Principle vs. Substance (God or Nature)In Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, “Heaven’s principle” (tianli) is the metaphysical basis of the cosmos, embodying both universal order and moral goodness. It is not a personal deity but the grounding rational and ethical structure of all existence. Humans share in this principle through their innate moral sense, and “preserving Heaven’s principle” means striving to reveal and maintain the inherent goodness within the human heart.

Spinoza’s metaphysical view centers on a single infinite substance: God or Nature. All phenomena are modes of this substance, existing necessarily according to its laws. Unlike the moral emphasis in Neo-Confucianism, Spinoza’s universe is ethically neutral at the metaphysical level. Nonetheless, through rational understanding of nature’s necessity, human beings can rise above ignorance and passivity, achieving a higher state of freedom and clarity.

In comparison, Neo-Confucianism imbues the universe with a moral tendency towards goodness, while Spinoza underscores the necessity and rational order of nature. Though their metaphysical frameworks differ—one morally oriented, the other emphasizing rational necessity—both acknowledge a comprehensible cosmic order. Human beings must align themselves, whether through moral principle or rational insight, to attain a higher spiritual state.

II. Desire, Human Nature, and ReasonFor the Neo-Confucians, “human desires” (renyu) do not refer to basic survival needs but to selfish, excessive cravings that obscure innate goodness. Removing such desires is essential to restoring the mind’s inherent moral clarity. The process of “removing human desires” aims at purifying the heart so that it can naturally express Heaven’s principle.

Spinoza, on the other hand, regards desires (cupiditas) as natural expressions of human striving. The problem arises when individuals remain slaves to blind, passive emotions. Freedom is attained by transforming these passive affects into active ones through rational understanding. Desire itself is not evil; it must be guided and elevated by reason.

While Neo-Confucianism advocates eliminating morally distorting desires to let innate goodness shine forth, Spinoza focuses on reshaping desire through rational insight. Both seek to prevent human beings from being ruled by lower impulses and to restore their capacity for rational moral agency, albeit via different conceptual routes—one by moral purification, the other by rational transformation.

III. Paths of Moral Practice: From Ethical Cultivation to Rational InsightNeo-Confucians prescribe a program of self-cultivation: investigation of things, extension of knowledge, sincerity, and self-examination. By constant moral reflection, daily introspection, and adherence to ritual and virtue, individuals gradually eliminate selfish desires. “Preserving Heaven’s principle and removing human desires” thus demands a lifelong commitment to ethical refinement.

Spinoza’s path involves the intellectual elevation of one’s understanding. Moving from confused sensory experience (first kind of knowledge) to rational inference (second kind) and finally to intuitive knowledge (third kind), one gains a clear, comprehensive grasp of nature’s necessity. This highest understanding frees individuals from being passively driven by emotions, enabling them to act from clear, active desires. Unlike Neo-Confucian stress on moral rituals and daily introspection, Spinoza emphasizes intellectual progress and the rational restructuring of the emotional life.

Despite their methodological differences, both traditions value continuous effort and incremental progress. Neo-Confucian ethics highlight moral introspection and character formation; Spinoza underscores intellectual illumination and affective transformation. Yet both aim to lift the human being from a state of bondage to a realm of greater freedom and harmony.

IV. Sociopolitical DimensionsNeo-Confucianism connects individual moral cultivation with social and political order. As the scholar-official class perfects their inner virtue through “preserving Heaven’s principle and removing human desires,” they bring about harmonious governance and a stable, ethically oriented society. Here, the personal and the political are integrated: moral refinement within leads to social peace without.

Spinoza, though less focused on a transcendent moral standard, also explores political dimensions in his Theological-Political Treatise and Political Treatise. He advocates for a rational, tolerant polity that curbs superstition and irrational passions. By fostering reason and understanding among citizens, the state creates conditions under which individuals can realize freedom. Although Spinoza’s political vision does not hinge on a moralized cosmic order, it shares the Neo-Confucian aspiration to curb irrational impulses and promote rational harmony in communal life.

In both traditions, rationality and ethical order form the backbone of sociopolitical well-being. Neo-Confucianism relies on moral virtue grounded in cosmic order, while Spinoza relies on rational insight into natural necessity. Both see rational principle as the ultimate guide for social stability and individual flourishing.

V. Synthesis and Contemporary ImplicationsPlacing “preserving Heaven’s principle and removing human desires” in dialogue with Spinoza’s philosophy reveals a shared belief in the transformative power of reason or fundamental principles. Neo-Confucianism stresses moral self-discipline and the realization of inherent goodness; Spinoza highlights the rational understanding of nature’s necessity and the reorientation of desires through knowledge.

While they depart from different ontological assumptions—Neo-Confucians championing moral goodness embedded in the cosmos, and Spinoza emphasizing impartial rational necessity—both encourage human beings to rise above impulsive, unexamined desires. The ultimate aim is moral, spiritual, or intellectual freedom.

In an age of consumerism, materialism, and moral pluralism, this comparative study offers enduring lessons. Borrowing from Neo-Confucian moral introspection and Spinoza’s emphasis on rational clarity can help guide individuals and societies toward more sustainable and meaningful values. This cross-cultural encounter underscores how diverse philosophical traditions can jointly contribute to modern ethical discourse.

ConclusionThe juxtaposition of “preserving Heaven’s principle and removing human desires” with Spinoza’s philosophy highlights how two distinctly different traditions grapple with reason, morality, and freedom. Neo-Confucianism roots moral endeavor in a universe fundamentally inclined towards goodness, while Spinoza builds freedom on understanding the rational structure of nature. Although the starting points and methodologies differ, both reject subservience to blind passions and champion alignment with a higher rational or moral principle.

In a globalized, pluralistic context, this kind of cross-cultural philosophical comparison can reinvigorate foundational ethical and metaphysical debates. Whether addressing environmental crises, social unrest, or individual existential anxieties, humanity can still draw from the wisdom of both traditions: by refining moral character through introspection or achieving rational liberation through knowledge, we seek a higher dimension of harmony and meaning.

Selected References:

• Zhu Xi. Reflections on Things at Hand, trans. Wing-tsit Chan. Columbia University Press, 1967.

• Wang Yangming. Instructions for Practical Living, trans. Wing-tsit Chan. Columbia University Press, 1963.

• Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics, trans. Edwin Curley. Penguin Classics, 1996.

• Chan, Wing-tsit. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton University Press, 1963.

• Nadler, Steven. Spinoza: A Life. Cambridge University Press, 1999.

By analyzing these two traditions in dialogue, we gain a richer understanding of how diverse philosophical lineages conceive the role of reason and virtue in human life, thus offering a valuable resource for contemporary ethical reflection.