美利坚的“G点”：盘点美国的网络敏感词(组图)

文章来源: 每日邮报 于 2012-05-27 21:04:16

美利坚的“G点”：盘点美国的网络敏感词(组图) 每日邮报

美利坚的G点：美国的网络敏感词

《每日邮报》，2012年5月26日

美国国土安全部（Department of Homeland Security，DHS）被迫公布了其用以监控社交网站和在线媒体以搜寻恐怖分子或其他针对美国的威胁的信号之关键词汇列表。

这个有趣的监控关键词列表既包括“袭击”、“圣战”、“恐怖主义”、“脏弹”等明显的字眼，也包括一些看上去很无辜的词汇，如“猪肉”、“云”和“墨西哥”等。

美国国土安全部（DHS）根据信息自由法案的要求公布了这个列表。这个信息有助于我们进一步了解美国政府情报分析师如何根据指令在互联网上搜寻潜在的国内外威胁。

[披露：美国国土安全部（DHS）根据《信息自由法案》（FOIA）的要求公布了其用以监控互联网以搜寻针对美国的威胁的信号之关键词汇列表]

这些词语被收录在美国国家运营中心（National Operations Center）工作人员所使用的美国国土安全部2011年“分析师桌面文件夹”中。工作人员依此识别“有关美国国土安全部的负面媒体报道及其应对行动”。

美国国土安全部领导在众议院就一桩根据《信息自由法案》（Freedom of Information Act，FOIA）获取有关文件的诉讼举行听证后被迫公开这个列表。这起诉讼揭示了情报分析师如何监控社交网络和媒体组织以确认有关政府的“负面”评论。

[译者按：2011年4月12日，美国电子隐私信息中心（EPIC）向美国国土安全部（DHS）提交了一项有关信息自由法案的申请，请求查看有关该 部媒体监控计划的详细记录。2011年4月28日，美国国土安全部承认收到电子隐私信息中心有关信息自由法案的申请，但是拒绝了请求。2011年12月 20日，电子隐私信息中心就此提起上诉，2012年1月，国土安全部披露了长达285页的记录以回应这起诉讼。]

然而他们坚称，这一实践并非为了监控互联网有关政府的毁谤性评论以及一般的异议符号，而是为了对潜在的各种威胁保持警惕。

情报分析师除了要分析恐怖主义，还要根据指令搜寻有关潜在的自然灾害、公共卫生威胁和诸如商场与学校枪击案、大型缉毒行动、拘捕非法移民等严重犯罪的证据。

这个列表被贴在美国电子隐私信息中心（Electronic Privacy Information Center，EPIC）的网站上。电子隐私信息中心（EPIC）是一个隐私监测机构，它在根据《信息自由法案》（FOIA）要求查询有关文件被拒后提起了诉讼。

这个中心在写给众议院国土安全委员会反恐与情报小组委员会（House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counter-terrorism and Intelligence）的信中称这些词语的选择“很是宽泛、含煳和模煳”。

[威胁侦测：美国国土安全部根据《信息自由法案》的要求公布了这个列表。这个信息有助于我们进一步了解美国政府情报分析师如何根据指令在互联网上搜寻潜在的国内外威胁]

他们指出，这个列表包括了“大量受宪法第一修正案保护的话语，它们完全无关于国土安全部保护公众远离恐怖主义伤害和自然灾害的使命。”

众议院一位高级官员告诉《赫芬顿邮报》，这一指南只是工作人员对自然和人为威胁保持情境感知的“一个起点，而非终点”。他否认政府监控异议符号。

然而该部承认他们所用的语言很含煳并有待改善。

国土安全部发言人马修•钱德勒（Matthew Chandler）在官网上称，“为了澄清，作为……日常符合性检讨的一部分，国土安全部将检讨所有材料中的用语以使之清晰、准确地传达（媒体监控）这一计划的范围和意图。”

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2bb23294-a4bf-11e1-9a94-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1y5tsbEl0

May 25, 2012 7:28 pm

By Mark Mazower

“They decided without us. Let us advance without them,” reads the slogan on the website of Syriza, the leftwing Greek party that shot to prominence after elections this month. But what emerges as one reads on is less a clear strategy for the country’s future than a worldview suffused with the images and memories of its turbulent past. Here, the fight against today’s perceived enemy – neoliberalism – evokes the struggle against the military junta 40 years ago, and the resistance to Nazi occupation during the second world war. There are even echoes of the Popular Front and the Comintern. Alexis Tsipras, Syriza’s leader, is too young to remember this: he was born just as the junta fell, in the summer of 1974. However, his party’s language reminds us that the eurozone crisis is raising some deep historical questions about what has happened to politics, to democracy and to the very idea of international co-operation.

It was in Europe, two centuries ago, where the idea emerged that the world was a governable place. This idea was radically new: the term “international” itself was coined by British philosopher Jeremy Bentham and only entered general circulation in the decades after Napoleon’s defeat. Although nationalism was emerging as a potent force at this time, the supporters of international co-operation were not alarmed. On the contrary, they believed that nationalism and internationalism were soul mates, that a continent of vibrant national democracies necessitated co-operation among its diverse people. Novelist Victor Hugo conjured up the vision of a federal Europe to a wildly cheering audience of peace activists in Paris in 1849; the Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini inspired US president Woodrow Wilson with his idea of a society of democratic nations.

If Wilson’s ill-fated League of Nations was one outcome of such views, other internationalists fought equally hard for free trade, or for communism. But the second world war saw anti-fascists in Europe return to the idea of federation for the continent as an antidote both to the bellicose nationalism of Hitler and Mussolini, and to the hopeless high-mindedness of the League. They believed that without integration, Europeans would continue to fight indefinitely; with it, the nation could be tamed and the needs of the weakest members of society guaranteed.

The origins of the EU thus reflect the persistence of the old idea that international co-operation is the best guarantee of national wellbeing. US support for European integration was premised on the belief not only that it would boost growth and keep communism at bay but that it would revive democracy itself. The early decades of the common market coincided not only with unprecedented productivity gains and growth across western Europe, but simultaneously with significant falls in inequality and enhanced spending on social services and welfare.

That achievement seems to belong to an almost neolithic past. The past 25 years have seen many of those gains reversed and have thrown into question the notion that national sovereignty and international co-operation are complementary. The architects of this reversal were not philosophers such as Bentham or revolutionaries such as Mazzini but sober technocrats such as Paul Volcker and the IMF’s Michel Camdessus. Managers of the global monetary system after the oil shocks of the 1970s, they believed that international prosperity and stability depended upon the liberalisation of capital movements. Europe’s enthusiastic participation in this financialisation of the global economy has had striking if largely unintended consequences.

All international organisations require their members to give up some sovereignty in exchange for the benefits of joining the group. But in earlier times, this choice did not entail anything close to the kinds of sacrifices that are required today. Legislatures within the EU, and especially within the eurozone, are now obliged to cede discretionary power to unelected central bankers, judges, bureaucrats and industry regulators. One does not have to be a supporter of Syriza to see how this allows established political parties in difficult times to be turned into stooges of shadowy special interests.

So what is at stake in the eurozone crisis goes beyond the consequences of a Greek exit and beyond even the future of the EU itself. The crisis has thrown into question the very idea that the world can be governed.

The EU itself was once the most ambitious and impressive realisation of this idea. In its 21st-century incarnation, however, the EU has allowed a dangerous gap to open up between rulers and ruled, technocrats and electorates. The contrast between the deference the EU pays to financial markets and its disdain for the social costs of satisfying them makes it harder for Europeans to believe in international co-operation as an obvious good.

“The type of oppression threatening democracies will not be like anything there has been in the world before,” Alexis de Tocqueville noted with foreboding near the end of his 1840 account of democracy in America. His sense of being stranded between an unrecuperable past and an unforeseeable future resonates in a moment in which the kind of international co-operation taking place in the EU no longer succours domestic political institutions but suffocates them.

Syriza may not have the answers to Greece’s problems or to Europe’s. But who does? Its historically encrusted rhetoric is a reminder that we are all groping for a new political language to understand what elements of our internationalist legacy we should preserve and what to jettison. Naturally, like Syriza, we reach back into the past for parallels, misleading though they may be. But the comforts of the past may be no guide as to what lies ahead in a world that is rapidly losing faith in the very possibility of its own governability.

The writer is professor of history at Columbia University and author of the forthcoming book ‘Governing the World: the History of an Idea’