知识究竟是客观的，还是主观的，或者是主客观结合的？

       对此问题至少有三种不同的解答途径。

       第一途径，涉及客观存在的问题即本体论的探讨视阈；

       第二途径，涉及主观认知的问题即认识论的探讨视阈；

       第三途径，涉及主客交融的问题或语言论的探讨视阈。

       再进一步，就引入了比物意文暨现象更深入的理义法暨本质的层面了。

       -邹晓辉Geneculture

       单脑（人脑或电脑）与双脑，对知识的看法是很不一样的。与之相应的表述形式和生产方式也很不一样。-邹晓辉

       如何从哲学问题经由形式化技术途径收敛为科学问题？这是知识模块精加工从小生产方式转变为大生产方式的一个关键问题。-邹晓辉Geneculture

       附图（邹晓辉理论融智学所述的融智三棱锥模型暨信息四面体模型）：

      附录（http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2350/1/U615298.pdf）：

       Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge: An epistemology of skill in science.

       Kiyimba, Kizito (2009) PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (United Kingdom).

       How can we claim to know and even tenaciously hold in science what we might possibly doubt. Standard methodologies of science have not answered this question persuasively. They either propose an answer that misrepresents science or they propose an irrational approach to science. The reason for these two extreme positions is that the accounts of science in these methodologies are based on a false ideal of objectivism - an assumption that the success of science as a branch of human knowledge is based on it being objective in the sense of being impersonal. Michael Polanyi propounds a theory of tacit knowledge, and I claim that this theory provides the best answer to the above question in that it represents scientific activity accurately and rationally. Polanyi rebuttals the false ideal of objectivism/impersonalism in scientific knowledge with a richer account of actual scientific practice. I show that he restores heuristics, and accounts for the role of skill without thereby succumbing to psychologism/subjectivism. I explore Collins and Pinch's claim that controversy is central to scientific progress, and critically examine Mwamba's book length study of Polanyi. I tackle the objections made by the Popperians (notably Alan Musgrave) to Polanyi's theory and the alternative methodology provided by Imre Lakatos/Elie Zahar. I argue that Popperianistic methodologies present incomplete accounts of science. Instead, understanding the nature and functions of tacit knowledge provides a richer epistemology of science. Further, the theory provides grounds for re-tackling the perennial problem of skepticism. In the theory, every act of knowledge is a skilful act and whenever we can point out that we know, we affirm our ways of knowing. Thus removed from the false ideal of objectivism, we are closer to resolving skepticism. The thesis is also an introduction to the still nascent philosophy of Michael Polanyi to analytic philosophy. It is akin to but not identical with Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science.