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最新论文发表
Scientific Reports vol.3: No.3292 (2013)
Braess's Paradox in Epidemic Game:
Better Condition Results in Less Payoff
流行病博弈中的布雷斯佯谬—
优裕条件带来低劣回报
作者: Hai-Feng Zhang (张海峰),Zimo Yang(杨紫陌),
Zhi-Xi Wu(吴枝喜),Bing-Hong Wang(汪秉宏),
Tao Zhou(周涛)
Facing the threats of infectious diseases, we take various actions
to protect ourselves, but few studies considered an evolving system with
competing strategies. In view of that, we propose an evolutionary epidemic
model coupled with human behaviors, where individuals have three strategies: vaccination, self-protection and laissez faire, and could adjust their strategies according to their neighbors' strategies and payoffs at the beginning of
each new season of epidemic spreading. We found a
counter-intuitive phenomenon analogous to the well-known Braess's Paradox, namely a better condition may lead to
worse performance. Specifically speaking, increasing the successful rate
of self-protection does not necessarily reduce the epidemic size or improve the system payoff. The range and
degree of the Braess's Paradox are sensitive to both the
parameters characterizing the epidemic spreading and the strategy payoff,
while the existence of the Braess's Paradox is insensitive
to the network topologies. This phenomenon can be well explained
by a meanfield approximation. Our study demonstrates an important fact
that a better condition for individuals may yield a worse outcome
for the society.
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