# 格雷厄姆·普里斯特（Graham Priest）在《Mind》上发表的文章分析

GRAHAM PRIEST; The Limits of Thought—and Beyond, Mind, Volume C, Issue 399, 1 July 1991, Pages 361–370, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/C.399.361

37．格雷厄姆·普里斯特（Graham Priest）

1. 查询：Graham Priest Mind

2. 结果：

2.1.

Is Arithmetic Consistent?

GRAHAM PRIEST

There are many possible models of paraconsistent logic that include all of the truths of the standard interpretation of arithmetic. Allowing such inconsistent arithmetics, in which n=n+1 is both true and false, has a number of advantages. For example, Uwe Petersen has provided an argument to prove that there exists a number x for which x=x+1. Paraconsistent arithmetic also avoids problems associated with Church's Theorem, Tarski's Theorem, and Godel's incompleteness theorem. Furthermore, Hilbert's Programme becomes redundant

算术一致吗？

有许多可能的次协调逻辑模型，包括算术标准解释的所有真理。 允许这种不一致的算术，其中n = n + 1既是真的又是假的，具有许多优点。 例如，Uwe Petersen提供了一个论证来证明存在x = x + 1的数x。 次协调算术也避免了与邱奇定理，塔斯基定理和哥德尔不完备性定理相关的问题。 此外，希尔伯特的计划变得多余。

GB/T 7714

Priest G. Is Arithmetic Consistent?[J]. Mind, 1994, 103(411):337-349.

MLA

Priest, Graham. "Is Arithmetic Consistent?." Mind 103.411(1994):337-349.

APA

Priest, G. (1994). Is arithmetic consistent?. Mind, 103(411), 337-349.

2.2.

Title:On inconsistent arithmetics: a reply to Denyer

Author(s): Graham Priest .

Source: Mind.

Document Type: Article

Abstract :

Nicholas Denyer's criticism of an article on inconsistent arithmetics is correct in some points, but also contains some misinterpretations, ad hominem arguments and sketchy reasoning. The direct argument for accepting the least inconsistent arithmetic M rather than the standard arithmetic is unacceptable, as Denyer correctly points out. However, the indirect argument for M still stands, despite Denyer's criticisms. The indirect argument shows that M avoids some difficulties related to classical theorems such as Church's Theorem, Tarski's Theorem and Godel's Incompleteness Theorems.

In "Is Arithmetic Consistent?" (1994a--hereafter, IAC) I drew attention to the fact that there are inconsistent but nontrivial theories that contain all the sentences true in the standard model of arithmetic, "N". The theories are not, of course, classical theories, but paraconsistent ones. I also argued that it is not as obvious that "N" is the correct arithmetic as one might suppose and that there are reasons for taking one of the inconsistent arithmetics, "M", with least inconsistent number, "m", to be the correct one. Two reasons were given. The first was a direct one; the second an indirect one, to the effect that "M" avoids most of the limitative theorems of classical metatheory. In "Priest's Paraconsistent Arithmetic" (1995--hereafter PPA), Nicholas Denyer gives a critique of the paper. The first four sections attack the indirect argument, the fifth the direct argument, and the sixth and final, section is an "ad hominem" attack. The paper is a mixture of insightful criticism, over-swift argument and misreading. The purpose of this note is to point out which parts are which.

GB/T 7714

PRIEST, G. On Inconsistent Arithmetics: A Reply to Denyer[J]. Mind, 1996, 105(420):649-659.

MLA

PRIEST, and G. "On Inconsistent Arithmetics: A Reply to Denyer." Mind 105.420(1996):649-659.

APA

PRIEST, & G. (1996). On inconsistent arithmetics: a reply to denyer. Mind, 105(420), 649-659.

2.3.

Logicians have been trying to solve the Liar Paradox and its associated family of insolubiles for the best part of two and a half thousand years; so one might well have thought that there could be no very new views on the topic. The subject is deep and hard, however; and this is not the case. In Replacing Truth , Kevin Scharp has come up with one.

The main idea is a variation of the thought that truth is an inconsistent concept (as endorsed by, e.g., Chihara, Eklund, and dialetheists). Its main novelty lies in the idea that it should be replaced by two notions. One of these, descending truth, D , satisfies the T -schema from left to right: . The other, ascending truth, A, satisfies it from right to left . Neither converse holds. (Here,

GB/T 7714

Priest G . Replacing Truth, by Kevin Scharp[J]. Mind, 2016, 125(498):fzv117.

MLA

Priest, Graham . "Replacing Truth, by Kevin Scharp." Mind 125.498(2016):fzv117.

APA

Priest, G. . (2016). Replacing truth, by kevin scharp. Mind, 125(498), fzv117.

2.4.

Hegel"s Dialectical Logicby Ermanno Bencivenga

Review by: Graham Priest

Mind

Vol. 111, No. 443 (Jul., 2002), pp. 643-646

https://www.jstor.org/stable/3093626

Page Count: 4

GB/T 7714

Priest G. Hegel's Dialectical Logic by Ermanno Bencivenga[J]. Mind, 2002, 111(443):643-646.

MLA

Priest, Graham. "Hegel's Dialectical Logic by Ermanno Bencivenga." Mind 111.443(2002):643-646.

APA

Priest, G. (2002). Hegel's dialectical logic by ermanno bencivenga. Mind, 111(443), 643-646.

2.5

Studia Logica

June 1982, Volume 41, Issue 2–3,  pp 249–268| Cite as

To be and not to be: Dialectical tense logic

Graham Priest

1. Philosophy Department, University of Western Australia, Nedlands, Australia

Abstract

The paper concerns time, change and contradiction, and is in three parts. The first is an analysis of the problem of the instant of change. It is argued that some changes are such that at the instant of change the system is in both the prior and the posterior state. In particular there are some changes from p being true to ℸp being true where a contradiction is realized. The second part of the paper specifies a formal logic which accommodates this possibility. It is a tense logic based on an underlying paraconsistent prepositional logic, the logic of paradox. (See the author's article of the same name Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979).) Soundness and completeness are established, the latter by the canonical model construction, and extensions of the basic system briefly considered. The final part of the paper discusses Leibniz's principle of continuity: “Whatever holds up to the limit holds at the limit”. It argues that in the context of physical changes this is a very plausible principle. When it is built into the logic of the previous part, it allows a rigorous proof that change entails contradictions. Finally the relation of this to remarks on dialectics by Hegel and Engels is briefly discussed.

Keywords

Formal Logic Basic System Model Construction Computational Linguistic Final Part

.

1982年6月，第41卷，第2-3期，第249-268页，引用为

1 澳大利亚 内德兰西澳大利亚大学 哲学系

2.6.

Discussion. The import of inclosure: some comments on Grattan-Guinness：Structural similarity or structuralism? Comments on Priest's analysis of the paradoxes of self-reference'' [Mind 107 (1998), no. 428, 823–834; MR1667172 (2000d:03003a)].

G Priest

Mind, Volume 107, Issue 428, October 1998, Pages 835–840, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/107.428.835

Published: 01 October 1998

 元素路径: body > p

http://blog.sciencenet.cn/blog-94143-1173063.html

## 全部精选博文导读

GMT+8, 2019-10-18 14:15