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面对传染病的威胁,人们有多种选择,或者打防疫针,或者改变行为习惯。但与此同时,他们必须承受如下代价:付打针费,有副作用,生活方式不舒服,如此等等。 上述这一现象使我们想起布雷斯佯谬:对于每一运动个体按照自私原则选择道路的交通网络,增加额外的通行能力,在某些情况下反而会降低总的通行性能。雍等人指出:在波士顿,纽约市和伦敦,可以通过某些道路的封闭来降低所预期的通行时间。帕拉等人则证明布雷斯佯谬可以出现在介观的电系统中:在一个纳米尺度的网络中增加一条电子通道,反而可能降低其电导。我们现在给出的这一工作又提供了另一个类似于布雷斯佯谬的有趣例子,其部分原因是由于自私个体的选择(就像囚徒困境中的“背叛者”之选择那样)增加了。 人们的选择和行为受到环境之影响,同时,他们的选择和行为又反过来改变环境。这一类相互作用导致许多小心设计的政策出现了意想不到的集体性的响应。 我们的工作,对于公共健康机构如何引导人们对付流行病,提出一种前所未有的挑战。对于普及免疫接种,医院治疗,自我保护,自我治疗等等,政府应当谨慎考虑如何分配资源与金钱。 http://arxiv.org/abs/1305.0361
Facing the threats of infectious diseases, we take various actions to protect ourselves, but few studies considered an evolving system with competing strategies. In view of that, we propose an evolutionary epidemic model coupled with human behaviors, where individuals have three strategies: vaccination, self-protection and laissez faire, and could adjust their strategies according to their neighbors' strategies and payoffs at the beginning of each new season of epidemic spreading. We found a counter-intuitive phenomenon analogous to the well-known emph{Braess's Paradox}, namely a better condition may lead to worse performance. Specifically speaking, increasing the successful rate of self-protection does not necessarily reduce the epidemic size or improve the system payoff. This phenomenon is insensitive to the network topologies, and can be well explained by a mean-field approximation. Our study demonstrates an important fact that a better condition for individuals may yield a worse outcome for the society.
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